Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) at Night
On January 15, 1998, a Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain was on a passenger flight from Edmonton to High Level, Rainbow Lake, Edmonton and Calgary, Alberta. Following an uneventful flight to Rainbow Lake, the aircraft departed in darkness at 19:35 Mountain standard time on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight to Edmonton. Shortly after takeoff from Runway 27 the aircraft collided with trees and terrain approximately 3000 ft. west of the departure end of the runway. The 9 occupants sustained minor injuries, and the aircraft was substantially damaged. This synopsis is based on the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) Final Report A98W0009.
The sky was clear with unrestricted visibility and light winds. The ambient lighting conditions were described as dark, with no moon, little illumination from the night sky and no lights to the west of the airport. The operator chartered the Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain and a pilot from another company. The company had flown the route for the operator in the past; however, the pilot had not previously flown for that operator. He had been employed as a charter pilot for approximately 6 months, held a valid airline transport pilot licence (ATPL) and had accumulated 3700 hrs of flight time, including 93 hrs on Piper PA-31 aircraft and 590 hrs at night. His background included flight instruction and charter. The majority of his charter experience was as a single pilot. He had never received formal two-crew flight training, recurrent ground training or simulator training that emphasized CFIT prevention strategies.
The operator routinely assigned two pilots to comply with the requests of a number of regular passengers and to inspire confidence. In accordance with that policy, a "co-pilot" was part of the flight, but was in fact a customer service representative, and not a flight-crew member. He assisted with baggage loading, passenger briefings and so on. He held a commercial pilot licence with an instrument rating, but did not hold a pilot proficiency check (PPC) for a Piper PA-31. The captain preferred to operate the aircraft as a single pilot, and the "co-pilot" was not assigned any formal cockpit duties.
There were no reported mechanical abnormalities with the aircraft. It was fitted with an approved supplementary device that increased the maximum permissible takeoff weight from 7000 lb. to 7368 lb. Runway 27 at the Rainbow Lake Airport is 4500 ft. long, with low-intensity runway edge lights, green threshold and red end lights and no approach lighting. It slopes uphill, and departures are accomplished into rising terrain.
Each passenger was permitted to transport a maximum combined weight of 50 lb. When the total load exceeded the gross weight of the Chieftain on any leg of the flight, it was the operator’s policy to remove the second pilot from the flight before reducing the number of passengers. Neither the chartered company nor the pilot had been advised of this policy.
The pilot completed a computer-generated flight plan and gross weight calculation, but there was no evidence that centre-of-gravity (C of G) calculations were performed. The visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan indicated that there would be a fuel stop in Peace River on the return leg. However, when the aircraft arrived in High Level, the pilot was informed that the operator did not normally stop in Peace River for fuel and preferred that the aircraft not do so in order to ensure that the flight remained on schedule. The pilot consulted with the "co-pilot" and was advised that one male passenger had been replaced with a female passenger, that most of the passengers would be travelling light, and that several of them weighed less than the standard passenger weight. The pilot amended the flight plan and added fuel to complete a VFR flight to Rainbow Lake and an IFR flight to Edmonton. A copy of the original company flight plan indicated that the pilot had originally planned to leave Rainbow Lake with 504 lb. of fuel.
Calculations completed after the accident indicated that approximately 850 lb. of fuel were on the aircraft at the time of departure from Rainbow Lake. Weight and balance calculations using estimated baggage and standard passenger weights indicated that the aircraft was at approximately 7473 lb. on takeoff from Rainbow Lake, and that the C of G was near the aft limit. Calculations using passenger self-reported weights indicated that 7 of the 9 passengers exceeded the standard passenger weight, that the aircraft was approximately 7683 lb., or about 315 lb. above the approved gross weight at takeoff, and that the C of G was about 0.35 in. aft of the aft limit.
The aircraft struck several trees with wings level in an approximate three-degree descent. It came to rest upright, and the cockpit and cabin sections remained intact; the occupant survival space was not compromised. The wings-level impact attitude, the shallow impact angle, the small tree size and the presence of approximately two feet of snow on the ground had contributed to maintaining the deceleration forces within the limits of human tolerance. The aircraft was reportedly equipped with a survival kit, as required by regulation, but investigators did not locate the kit in or near the aircraft.
Aircraft using Rainbow Lake airport typically take off from Runway 09 during night departures if the wind conditions permit, as several lights are visible to the east then. On arrival at Rainbow Lake, the pilot had been advised by the "co-pilot" of a minor frost heave in Runway 09 near the runway threshold. To avoid the risk of damaging the nosewheel during takeoff, the pilot elected to depart on Runway 27.
The pilot selected 10° of flap for takeoff and rotated at 85 kt. indicated airspeed (IAS). He believed that the aircraft became airborne at 90 kt. approximately halfway down the runway, and that he had established and maintained a positive rate of climb. He reported that he was waiting for the aircraft to accelerate to the "blue line" speed (best single-engine rate of climb) of 107 kt. IAS prior to lifting the flaps when the aircraft struck the trees. The landing gear and the flaps were in the UP position at impact.
Soon after liftoff, the pilot was confronted with dark, featureless terrain. Darkness and the absence of external visual clues may induce a false perception of altitude and attitude. Under acceleration, the combination of gravity and inertial forces produces a resultant force at an angle aft of the true vertical. This force, acting on the vestibular system of the human inner ear, can give a false pitch-up sensation. While the aircraft may be flying straight and level or climbing slightly, pilots may have a sensation of climbing at a much steeper angle than they actually are. Without visual input to override the false sensation, the pilot will usually pitch the aircraft’s nose down to correct the perceived steep climb, and inadvertently descend. This form of spatial disorientation is known as the "false climb" or somatogravic illusion. The extent, if any, to which somatogravic illusion contributed to this accident was not determined.
The TSB’s analysis focused on the pilot’s applied IFR/night takeoff technique, the role and influence of the "co-pilot," the communications between the chartered company and the operator, the request to change the flight plan, and the effect of the overweight condition of the aircraft on the departure. Individually, these factors would likely not have been significant enough to cause an accident. When combined with dark ambient conditions and an uphill takeoff toward rising terrain, these factors collectively established a window of opportunity for an accident to occur.
The pilot’s night departure technique is considered to be the active failure in this accident. Night departures in dark conditions require full use of the aircraft flight instruments, and it is essential that the pilot achieve and maintain a positive rate of climb. In the absence of outside visual cues, the pilot must rely on the aircraft instruments to maintain airspeed and attitude and to overcome any false sensations of climb. The pilot was either relying on outside visual cues during the initial climb and/or using only a partial instrument panel scan while being influenced by the false-climb illusion. Pilots can overcome false sensations by flying the aircraft with reference to the altimeter, vertical speed indicator, attitude indicator and airspeed indicator, which, in this case, would likely have allowed the pilot to detect that the aircraft was not in a climb. The appropriate technique would have been to climb at the aircraft’s best rate or best angle-of-climb speed until above all obstacles rather than become preoccupied with reaching blue line.
The role of the "co-pilot" is somewhat ambiguous, and his presence does not appear to have contributed to the safety of the flight. Because he was not familiar to the captain and because he was not delegated flight-crew responsibilities, his participation during the flight created a situation of crew resource mismanagement. The co-pilot’s remarks regarding the weight and flight-plan changes at High Level appear to have encouraged the captain to cancel the planned fuel stop in Peace River. The co-pilot did not advise the captain that, if weight was a concern, he could remain in Rainbow Lake. The co-pilot’s apparent well-intentioned advice on the frost heave near the threshold of Runway 09 influenced the captain’s decision to take off on Runway 27, which was uphill toward rising terrain and with no lights visible after departure.
The estimated weight of the aircraft at takeoff, which was approximately 315 lb. above the prescribed increased gross weight, and the C of G, which was at or beyond the rear limit, would have increased the takeoff distance and reduced the climb performance of the aircraft. The request to the captain in High Level to add fuel in order to avoid a stop at Peace River contributed to the aircraft’s being overweight on departure from Rainbow Lake.
Communication between the operator and the chartered company with regard to the duties of the co-pilot and the weight of the aircraft at departure from Rainbow Lake were inadequate. Both companies were familiar with Piper PA-31-350 capabilities, and the weight and balance calculations performed prior to the aircraft’s leaving Edmonton indicated that the trip would have to be accomplished VFR, with a fuel stop at Peace River, to accommodate the passenger load. Critical information, such as the option of dropping the co-pilot in the event of an overweight aircraft condition, was never provided to the chartered company. The pilot, who was the final decision-maker, was put in the position of having to balance the conflicting objectives of operating the aircraft within the prescribed weight limits and satisfying the customer’s demands. He was relatively inexperienced on Piper PA-31-350 aircraft, having flown less than 100 hrs on the type, and, because he had not previously flown for the operator, he was unfamiliar with its daily flight routine.
The TSB determined that the aircraft was inadvertently flown into trees and the ground in controlled flight and dark ambient conditions during a night departure because a positive rate of climb was not maintained after takeoff. Factors contributing to the accident were the pilot’s concentrating on blue-line speed rather than maintaining a positive rate of climb, the dark ambient conditions, a departure profile into rising terrain, an overweight aircraft and crew resource mismanagement.
CRM Training - A Good Look
Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a vital element of flight crew training which, after initial reluctance towards its acceptance, is now mandated across the globe. In this feature, Mr. Huang Jian, Chief Engineer of the Simulator Training Center, China Civil Aviation Flight College, considers how CRM is approached and viewed in China. This article is condensed from CAT, the Civil Aviation Training magazine, April 1999 issue, with permission.
CRM training is an industry-wide initiative to provide flight-crew members with the skills and knowledge required to make efficient use of all available resources during ground and flight operations. These resources include all flight-deck sources of information, all available crew members, ground service technicians and mechanics, and airline dispatchers and engineers. CRM training is intended to help flight-crew members safely operate today's modern jet transports.
CRM has been around for nearly 20 years. It got its impetus from various places: the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), academic research and the airline industry. A NASA-funded study in 1979 using Boeing 747 flight crews showed that those crews who made effective, integrated use of cockpit resources performed in a satisfactory manner. Subsequent analysis of these crews' performance showed a direct relationship between performance and effective intracockpit communication. Most major airlines have established or adopted a formal CRM training program for their flight-crew members.
It is critically important that instructor pilots be able to recognize poor CRM skills in their students and make serious efforts to remedy the situation. Captains and first officers must be made aware of the importance of proper CRM and how it affects the safety of modern airline operations. There are nine major skill categories or attributes.
1. CAPTAIN'S AUTHORITY
The captain's authority is a defined set of command duties and responsibilities and the discretionary power to carry them out. The captain is ultimately responsible for the safety of the passengers, the flight crew and the aircraft. He/she is responsible for adherence to all regulations and directives. First officers are also required to learn the duties and responsibilities of the captain in case the captain becomes incapacitated. Someone who demonstrates the proper knowledge of captain's authority should be able to:
- Declare and exercise emergency authority.
- Exert managerial control over the crew, cockpit or situation.
- Direct crew member actions.
- Assign duties and responsibilities.
2. CONDUCT TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF CREW MEMBERS
This is the recognition and critique of inadequate performance and the explanation and demonstration of correct procedure. A crew member conducting training and development of fellow crew members should take an active and sincere interest in seeing them improve and should offer them help and encouragement. This is primarily the captain's responsibility, but it is also a mutual responsibility of all crew members because of the varying amounts of experience that exist in the crew. For example, a senior pilot can offer suggestions and encouragement to a less experienced pilot after a not-so-perfect approach, but without degrading or humiliating the individual. An experienced first officer may also help a new captain with certain cockpit duties as needed.
Someone who demonstrates the proper training and development of crew members should be able to:
- Identify and describe improper CRM behaviour.
- Counsel crew members.
- Identify and describe improper procedures, operations and knowledge.
- Demonstrate correct procedures and operations in a learning environment.
3. PROMOTE A POSITIVE INTERPERSONAL AND GROUP CLIMATE
This is a goal that, when properly accomplished, results in a positive group climate, open communications, mutual respect and confidence among crew members, and free and open exchange of ideas without fear of repercussion. This is also the responsibility of the captain. For example, the tone in the cockpit is relaxed and supportive. Crew members do not interrupt one another, they exhibit patience, and they answer questions directly. An individual who properly demonstrates this CRM attribute should be able to:
- Demonstrate openness to suggestions and change.
- Demonstrate respect for and confidence in crew members.
- Actively establish open communication channels.
- Provide and accept feedback.
- Encourage crew members to freely state opinions and participate in discussions.
4. COMMUNICATION
Communication is the mechanics, art and craft of successfully and accurately transmitting and receiving messages. Communication can be verbal or non-verbal and has four major elements: inquiry; advocacy; conflict resolution; and critique.
"Inquiry" means soliciting information from a crew member, ATC, company resources, the flight management system (FMS) or the flight manual.
"Advocacy" means stating a position, sending a message and making sure the message is received.
"Conflict resolution" means acknowledging and reconciling differences in information or advocated positions. For example, the captain may advocate going left of the thunderstorm, and the first officer may advocate going right; conflict-resolving communication takes place, and the crew agrees to go right. Conflict resolution does not mean that there is a personal conflict.
"Critique" may be on-going or related to a specific task. On-going critique is the crew's constant review and communication about the flight plan and flight events. For example, a crew is engaging in an on-going critique when they note that their fuel burn is off by 6000 lb. over a particular checkpoint and then discuss the variation. Task-related critique involves giving and receiving feedback after a task or a flight is complete. This type of critique is often more difficult for crew members, in part because it has the connotation of being "critical of the individual." Note that critique is a neutral term, and it should also include important communication about good performance.
Communication is the most basic CRM attribute and is critical to safe aircraft operation.
Someone who demonstrates proper CRM communications should be able to:
- Inquire and solicit information.
- Advocate positions and solicit feedback to confirm that the position was heard.
- Listen actively to conflicting opinions.
- Actively describe and clarify incomplete and/or conflicting information.
- Focus on the problem, not the person.
- Advocate proposed solutions to conflicting information or opinion.
- Actively and outwardly review plans as they are carried out during the flight.
- Provide critique and feedback upon completion of a task or flight.
- Actively acknowledge feedback/critique on own performance.
5. PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
This is an efficient and logical sequence of crew actions that generate a solution to a problem. The process is as follows:
- The crew recognizes a problem.
- The crew gathers information about the problem.
- The crew defines the problem based on the information.
- The crew formulates solutions to the problem.
- The crew applies what appears to be the best solution.
- The crew evaluates the result to see if the solution solved the problem.
- If the solution fails to solve the problem, the crew reformulates the problem by repeating steps B to F as necessary.
An individual who demonstrates proper problem-solving abilities should be able to:
- Recognize that a problem exists.
- Gather information about the problem.
- Define the problem based on the information gathered.
- Formulate solutions to the problem.
- Apply what appears to be the best solution.
- Evaluate results to determine if the solution has solved the problem.
- Re-evaluate a problem if a solution doesn't work.
6. DECISION MAKING
This is the determination to act, or not to act, in response to an input or event. Decision making occurs after all relevant information has been solicited and gathered, positions have been stated, and any differences or disagreements have been resolved. Proper decision making should result in a clear plan of attack that is supported by all crew members. Decision making is a necessary part of problem solving and must be done in a timely manner.
Someone who demonstrates proper decision-making abilities should be able to:
- Describe decision making guidelines to other crew members.
- Clarify incomplete and/or conflicting information.
- Communicate decisions clearly.
7. WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT
This is the ability to effectively prioritize and sequence work required for safe flight operations while avoiding work overload. An individual who practices proper workload management, assigns duties and responsibilities clearly, anticipates problems, and plans for their crew does not become overloaded at critical times. While managing the workload is an on-going task, it is most important in high workload and/or time compressed situations.
Someone who demonstrates proper workload management should be able to:
- Communicate plans or guidelines for crew actions.
- Prioritize and sequence crew workload.
- Clearly assign tasks and actively confirm individual understanding of them.
- Describe potential problems/conflicts and a plan to handle them.
8. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
This refers to the crew's consciousness of aircraft status in relation to operational and environmental conditions. Situationally aware crews know where the aircraft is, and where it will be. They are informed of all available cockpit resources and are alert to the information provided by flight displays, navigational aids, the FMS and other crew members.
A situationally aware crew member should be able to:
- Alert other crew members to operational and environmental conditions.
- Maintain focus on central problems despite distractions.
- Alert other crew members to conditions ahead of the aircraft.
- Select instrument and flight management computer (FMC) displays for information relevant to the phase of flight.
9. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
This is the flight crew's use of resources available outside the cockpit. Effective resource management requires that crew members know the available sources of information and how to use them.
A crew member who demonstrates proper resource management should be able to:
- Describe all sources of information available.
- Call external sources for information and assistance.
- Direct other crew members to use external sources.
- Counsel other crew members on the appropriate time to seek assistance.
In summary, CRM is a core element of modern flight training. It should no longer be considered as a stand-alone element of flight training but an all-encompassing aspect that permeates the whole process.
Flight Itinerary, ELT, and Survival Plan
One Monday in early March, a pilot and his friend were preparing to go on a fishing trip from lac aux Sables to lac Drouin, Quebec, in a ski-equipped Piper PA12 in visual flight rules (VFR) conditions. The pilot told his wife they would be back Friday if the weather permitted, but said she was not to worry if conditions were poor, because they would wait until the weather improved.
After three uneventful days of fishing, the two men decided to depart lac Drouin at noon on Thursday and return to lac aux Sables one day before they had planned to avoid bad weather. On the same day, a commercial carrier in Latuque grounded its aircraft because of adverse weather, including freezing rain and reduced visibility.
A few minutes after take-off, the aircraft encountered snow, then mist, and finally entered mist, but the pilot still did not adopt a new plan. The aircraft crashed in cruise flight on lac Sincennes, about 40 mi. west of Latuque, in conditions conducive to white-out. The aircraft was severely damaged, but both occupants survived the crash.
The pilot sustained head injuries, and the passenger’s jaw and two legs were fractured. The men moved away from the aircraft because they feared it would catch fire. A short time later, the pilot gave the passenger a sleeping bag that he kept in the aircraft, and told him he was going for help. Unfortunately, there was no emergency locator transmitter (ELT) on the aircraft, and, of course, the only person who knew their itinerary was told that they would not return until Friday. But even worse: she was told not to worry if they didn't make it back on Friday.
By Sunday, having received no news from her husband, the pilot’s wife told a friend that her husband had not yet returned, but that she thought he was staying at the cabin until the weather cleared. Search and Rescue (SAR) was notified at 19:20 EST on Sunday, and the aircraft was found the next morning, Monday, around 08:30.
The pilot’s body was found half a mile from the wreckage. He had dug three holes in the snow at different locations, probably for shelter from the weather. The injured passenger could not seek shelter in the wreckage because the pain from his fractures was too intense. He spent three nights in the sleeping bag on the frozen surface of the lake. By Sunday morning — the first nice day — his legs were both frozen but he was able to crawl to the wreckage. The severely injured passenger was finally rescued on Monday morning, but his legs had to be amputated below the knee.
Analysis - What’s left to analyse? The events recounted above are clear enough, and the lessons are also clear. Your flight plan or itinerary is crucial, and you absolutely must file it like a professional, no matter where you are going. Never make a vague plan or your rescue could be at risk.
If you must depart sooner, always advise a responsible person by whatever means are available before departing, or as soon as possible afterward. If proper notification is impossible, stick to your original plan or leave later, not sooner, but advise the authorities to avoid an unnecessary search.
If you have no ELT on board and you fly over isolated areas, you are taking unacceptable risks. This recent accident is exactly what we are all trying to prevent, and it is regrettable that the story had to be told here.
Finally, in a survival situation, there are some basic rules that everyone should know. First, it is essential to provide for your own well-being and that of your passengers. That means: give first aid, find or build a shelter as close as possible to the accident site, and, if you can, make a fire to keep warm and maintain morale. Once physical protection is taken care of, find a source of water, and, if possible, food. Think about preparing signal fires, especially if the site is hard to see from the air. If you venture away the site for any reason, blaze your trail on the trees so you can find your way back. SAR will find you sooner or later. If you have never had survival training, call the nearest SAR Centre for further details.
The passenger's life was almost certainly saved by the sleeping bag, and this proves the value of having survival gear on board. However, is it possible that both men could have survived if the pilot had stayed with the passenger so they could keep each other warm, and so they could reassure each other while waiting? At the very least, the pilot would have had a greater chance of survival. The decision to go for help in these circumstances, although honourable, was, it would seem, an error in judgment as to the initial action to take in a survival situation.
And last but not least, regarding flight in marginal weather - as we all know - aviators should never play Russian roulette with the weather because five out of six chambers will be loaded!
Flying Safely with GPS
by Ross Bowie, SatNav Program Manager, NAV CANADA
Most pilots who have used global positioning systems (GPS) agree that it makes flying more efficient and in some ways safer. Previous Aviation Safety Letter articles highlighted some potential hazards of misusing GPS. Many more pilots have started using GPS since the last article, so we thought it timely to review some of the safety issues.
Our experience with various types of GPS avionics suggests good training is essential. A couple of decades ago when the flight management system (FMS) appeared in new airliners, many pilots found that mastering the FMS was more difficult than flying the aircraft. Thanks to modern computers, today’s small GPS receivers have more features than FMSs, and the GPS manual can be thicker than the aircraft's.
Safety depends on using avionics properly. The easy way to learn is to focus on necessary functions: entering and activating a flight plan; making changes to the flight plan in the air, including adding arrival and approach procedures; and navigating en route, in the terminal area and on approach. Find out the best ways to do these things then practice. Many GPS avionics can be used at home or in the classroom. Take advantage of this to learn the basics without wasting fuel, and without having to watch for traffic and fly the aircraft.
Many pilots use GPS as an aid to visual flight rules (VFR) navigation. The key word is "aid," because VFR means seeing the terrain well enough to confirm your position on a map. Avionics used for VFR do not check for errors in satellite signals, so your GPS position could be bad. Finger trouble (entering the wrong waypoint co-ordinates) could have you flying very accurately to the wrong place. A "simple" panel mount or hand held unit depends on hundreds of thousands of lines of software code. When was the last time you made it through a week without your personal computer doing something that made no sense? None of these problems occurs very often, but neither does fuel contamination, and we check for that every day.
GPS accuracy and reliability have led some pilots to depart VFR on days when the visibility is too low for VFR navigation. This could lead to loss of control owing to disorientation or collision with unseen obstacles. When the weather is marginal, a VFR-rated pilot should assume GPS is not available then decide whether to depart. On days when the weather deteriorates en route, it is critical to use your map and fly at a safe altitude.
In instrument flight rules (IFR) flight a key to safety is situational awareness - knowing where you are, where you are headed next and how you are going get there without tangling with obstacles, weather or any other hazard. Keep up with the aircraft and the environment. Know your route, particularly in the terminal area, by preparing before departure and arrival. Time spent studying charts can make all the difference if air traffic control (ATC) changes your clearance; familiarity with terrain and obstacles can ensure awareness of hazards. Verify waypoint co-ordinates, or check that bearings and distances make sense; data bases are far from perfect. Know what the vionics should be doing next and ensure it does what you intended. If it does not, take control immediately, ensure the aircraft follows a safe path, then sort out the problem. Do not become engrossed with the avionics at the expense of flying the aircraft.
The complexity of GPS avionics can increase workload at critical times. With very high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR) stations, all we do is change a frequency and set a course. Time spent programming GPS avionics takes away from managing the flight, but there are ways to reduce the hazard. Complete familiarity with the avionics helps. The key, however, is to minimize programming during departure and arrival, when workload is already high and when the terrain is nearby. At the pre-flight stage, load the flight plan to destination and perhaps from destination to alternate to minimize head-down time and workload during flight. Most airlines discourage any programming of the FMS below 10 000 ft. on arrival. This would obviously not be practical in a Cessna 172, but the message is: get the programming done early and do not try to make major changes near the ground. Your number one job is to fly the aircraft.
One challenge we face with GPS is that the first generation of avionics does not have a common pilot interface. Transport Canada and NAV CANADA strongly support the use of moving map displays to enhance situational awareness. The good news is that the next generation of receivers all seem to have moving maps. Some units are simpler to use than others. It makes sense to evaluate a unit’s user-friendliness before buying.
Next, a controversial issue: if two aircraft on opposite courses are using GPS, does the risk of collision increase? The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Transport Canada and NAV CANADA, among others, have been studying this for several years and have not come to a conclusion. We rely on various procedures and services to avoid collisions: flying at an altitude appropriate to direction of flight; ATC, using radar and position reports; communications (on the proper frequency or frequencies) with other pilots in uncontrolled airspace and near airports without control or advisory service; and watching for other traffic. Some have suggested flying offset tracks. For IFR operations, ATC separation provides the necessary margin of safety. For VFR, the question is: offset from what? All we can suggest at this point is that pilots using GPS on regular VFR routes could stay to the right of centre. This is already recommended when flying along rivers or valleys. This does not replace communicating, watching for other traffic and minimizing head-down time.
Finally, ensure you are familiar with Canadian regulations. Much of the information on GPS comes from the United States, where pilots can use GPS in lieu of distance measuring equipment (DME) and automatic direction finders (ADF), and can fly overlay approaches without monitoring underlying aids. This is not currently the case in Canada for several reasons: we depend much more on non-directional beacons (NDB) and we do not have the density of VORs, airports or radar coverage. If your aircraft is not equipped for Canadian operations, you will encounter flight restrictions that may cause safety problems.
Transport Canada and NAV CANADA have set up a joint team to review GPS operational, technical and safety issues. If you have any comments on any aspect of GPS operations, please e-mail them to This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it., or send a fax to NAV CANADA’s SatNav Program Office at (613) 563-5602.
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We would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada for this initiative through the Search and Rescue New Initiative Fund (SAR NIF).